Written by U Ne Oo on 1999-04-20
Most of Burmese pro-democracy campaigners had little or no
information
about the personal hardships of ASSK and her family, until late
last month
on the news about Michael Aris's grave illness broke. After
Michael Aris
death, tributes by fellow Burma democracy campaigners were
pouring
in especially on Internetcially on Internet and various media. Michael Aris was a
remarkable
man who can face such the personal hardships with a great
calmness
and integrity. As an "admirer from a distance", I do not
personally know
nor had any contact with him. His death, however, has saddened
me. I am
outraged by the fact that Burmese generals manipulating
the ASSK's
family tragedy to their advantage. I am even more
concerned about
SPDC/SLORC's tendency to use any leverage to destroy its
opponents, especially
Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD.
SPDC/SLORC'S PLOT AGAINST AUNG SAN SUU
KYI
As all of us are aware, the SPDC/SLORC since 1988 has
mounted
a relentless campaigns against Aung San Suu Kyi and her
leadership,
especially in connection with her marriage to a foreigner. In
speaking
of the truth, SPDC/SLORC has some point to contend on this fact.
However,
because Suu Kyi is the daughter of Burma's national hero,
General Aung
San, the Burmese public opinion on Suu Kyi has not
changed.
On the other hand, Suu her hand, Suu Kyi's commitment to Burma democratic
cause that
combined by her political work, in particular establishing
and maintaining
the National League for Democracy party, in its own right
becomes
respectable to the Burmese public. Adding to this respectability
was various
international awards, including Nobel Peace Prize, as
recognition of her
work. ASSK now has an enormous political profile, both
domestically
and internationally, that unmatched to her opponents.
From the SPDC/SLORC's part, ASSK's marrt, ASSK's marriage to a foreigner had been the biggest draw-card to attack Aung San Suu Kyi. No doubt, for the 'Propaganda writers' of the New Light of Myanmar as well as the Burmese generals, including junta's chief strategist General Khin Nyunt, the single focal point of attack on Suu Kyi's leadership is her marriage. Aung San Suu Kyi on her part has reportedly maintained her Burmese passport and citizenship despite living in Britain for many years. Undoubtedly, after the death of Michael Aris, SPDC/SLORC no longer have a founda have a foundation to attack Aung San Suu Kyi--a widow. In fact, both in SPDC/SLORC's eyes and in actual fact, Aung San Suu Kyi has now become politically invincible leader.
One objective for SPDC/SLORC's writing the constitution and holding a new election is to get rid of Aung San Suu Kyi from Burma's political scene. As we all know, the SPDC/SLORC laid down a guideline in writing constitution in order to exclude Aung San Suu Kyi in future political process. SPDC/SLORC leaders must have been hoping to excluoping to exclude Aung San Suu Kyi in a new election--i.e. after writing the constitution--probably on the ground of her marriage. With the death of Michael Aris, those Burmese generals' hope were also dashed. In fact, the SPDC/SLORC leadership now have no justifiable reason to exclude Aung San Suu Kyi from any future political process.
SPDC/SLORC AND POLITICALLY-CONSTRUCTIVE
ENGAGEMENT
An alarming trend observed in recent years is
the SPDC/SLORC
leadership's unwillingness to reconcile with the opile with the opposition.
SPDC/SLORC
use almost any political space--some being made available for
reconciliation
with the opposition--in order to attack NLD and Aung San Suu
Kyi. Some
Burmese democracy campaigners complain to it as the shortcomings
of the
(politically) constructive engagement towards Burma(i.e. Burmese
junta).
In a constructive engagement, the international community
may, for
example, give some political concession to entice the junta to
make a further
reform. Unfortunately, this does not happen in dealing wi in dealing with the
Burmese
junta. Such a lack of success about constructive engagement for
Burma probably
lies not on the merits of the engagement itself. The
failure, in
part, rests with the international community's inability to
backed-up such
engagement with a proper leverage with a substantial political
power. On
the other hand, the political intransigence of the Burmese
generals that
generated by narrow mindness and non-openness can
also be the
problem.
One example of constructive engagement is the Aagement is the ASEAN membership. In this case, the international commnity has given some political concession to SPDC/SLORC to make further reform. The Burmese junta, however, is unable to use such initiative for further reforms. Whist the junta is making propaganda for its membership within ASEAN, the pressure on opposition has increased and failing to move forward on reconciliation.
If a man's judgment on others people's action is believed to be based upon his self image, there will indeed be an enormous gap for the Burap for the Burmese generals, including General Khin Nyunt, to enter any genuine political negotiation. This problem occurs because of the Burmese military clique's fundamental mis-understanding about politics and political processes (In Burma, that problem is not only confined to military establishment, I must say). To many of those Burmese, politics or political process is not being considered as that of mutual understanding and cooperation of the masses. But the politics is primarily considered as playing dirty tricks upony tricks upon its opponent and exercising power on the subordinate (Thu-myar-myet-khone-hmway-paw-zin-gyan-shout). With this kind of outlook on politics, any initiative--including the genuine moves for reconciliation--by the opponent will be interpreted by military as simply playing tricks.
Recent incident of the late Michael Aris' request to visit Rangoon is an example. Michael Aris' request for visit to Burma was considered by the Burmese generals as a possible trick by the opponents to publicise the cause of Aung Saause of Aung San Suu Kyi. Tragically, in this case, Michael Aris' request was a genuine one made in the desperate circumstances. It is a prime example of how Burmese generals will perceive any of their political opponent's words and actions as the tricks.
The circumstances on Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD that led up to recent time also need examining. Although the general public, only until recently, was unaware about Michael Aris's serious illness, the SPDC/SLORC certainly have had the knowledge about it and also the pressurso the pressure on Aung San Suu Kyi (NB: every phone conversation with ASSK were monitored by Military Intelligence Services). It appears that SPDC/SLORC had try to take advantage of this fact in order to expel ASSK from Burma. After the NLD demanded to convene the parliament in last August, SPDC/SLORC put all MP-elects under the detention and, then, the most serious campaign to expel ASSK was launched, with the knowledge that ASSK has been under pressure to reunite with her family. This is a rather disturbing exampleurbing example of SPDC/SLORC attempting to destroy its opponent whenever an opportunity arise. In this case, however, the SPDC/SLORC has grossly miscalculated ASSK's commitment to the cause of Burma democracy movement.
In sum, the Burmese generals' mistrust about other political leaders ( &the political non-openness), the narrow outlook on politics and the pettiness of mind are to be considered as the major obstacle for negotiation. Nevertheless, recent change in circumstances, hopefully, may force Burmese generals to retgenerals to rethink their stand on the opposition NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi.
THE WAY FORWARD FOR RECONCILIATION
We, the pro-democracy campaigners, must remind ourselves
that, in a
political movement, having a leader with a high and invincible
profile
is not enough. The democracy leaders who have genuine goodwill
and understanding
of general public can only be a starting point. Doing
politics and
engaging in political negotiation will require the plans and
policies.
Political negotiation is not simpion is not simply about two opposing leaders
shaking
hands. Following facts, therefore, may be worth
examining for
the pro-democracy campaigners and the NLD leadership.
(A) The NLD leadership must have a clear set of objectives
when offering
negotiation with SPDC/SLORC. In my personal view, forming an
interim administration
with the NLD(& CRPP) to take Legislative role and SPDC/SLORC
to take
Executive role presents the best possible solution.
As such,
the NLD leadership should clearly spell-out theirpell-out their intention
on their
moves on convening parliament. Part of the anxiety of
SPDC/SLORC,
which resulted in arresting the MPs last August, appears to be
the NLD's
possibility to declare an alternative government of Burma.
In my view, there will be no stigma for NLD making
compromise
with Burmese junta in this way. In changing a military
dictatorship to
democracy, there has to be some form of interim
arrangement. For
example, in South Africa, the ANC and de Klerk Government have
to nment have
to compromise
before a full democratic process can be exercised. The
development in Indonesian
democracy movement is also worth noting. In Indonesia, the
democracy movement
does not attempt--except students-- to replace the Soherto
regime with
a completely new government. Soherto regime was replaced by a
somewhat
softer Habibi government whilst moving towards greater
democracy. This
can be considered as a shrewed decision on the part of
Indonesian democracy
movement. The point is that, as contrast to changing
goveng
government within
an established system, the changing of political system
will require
to take certain intemediate steps.
(B) Political accommodation for ethnic minority groups should be made clear by the NLD. In politics, there is no substitute for a publicly agreed plan and policy when various political actors are involved. Holding trust on the goodwill and honesty of the NLD leadership alone is not sufficient to resolve the ethnic minority issues in Burma. The UN General Assembly recommending a tri-paending a tri-partite dialogue is a good start. It will be appropriate for the NLD leaders to guarantee to the ethnic minority leaders about the participation in drafting federal constitution.
(C) The U.N. contact group for Burma should be supported by
NLD leadership.
To my knowledge, there had been initiatives by U.S. Congressman
Bill Richardson
in 1995 and the Canadian Foreign Minister L. Anxworthy in 1997
to establish
a U.N. contact group for Burma. The fact such U.N. contact group
failed
to get up from the ground, I sue ground, I suspect, is that whether there
might be some
objection by NLD leadership to have such contact group.
When we look around the world's trouble spots, such as
Middle-East,
former Yugoslavia or, of recent, Kosovo, there has to be an
international
contact group to deal with the crisis. One of the Burmese
concerns might
be that such contact group may become an avenue for foreign
powers to interfere
in Burmese politics. However, the truth of the fact is that we,
the Burmese,
must seek valuable advise and supporise and support from the international
community
as a whole. As long as we Burmese ourselves "know what we want"
and able
to make the political decisions, there can be no such thing as
interference.
I believe the U.N.Contact group is not only fashionable
but also
is a necessity for Burma.
Our Burma democracy campaigners and, especially NLD
leadership, should
be aware that current non-violent struggle in Burma is primarily
the contest
between the military power and other different form of powers,
such as
the ,
such as
the powers of influence, legitimacy, truth and justice. The
power of truth
is an important one, but proven to be less effective with the
Burmese generals.
The Burma democracy movement must enhance its powers of
influence through
such international contact group.
(D) In dealing with SPDC/SLORC, the international community
should
prepare to marginalise the Burmese junta if it fails to make
cooperations
on following matters: (1) the U.N. Human Rights Special
Rapporteur to visit
Burma, especially to the Shan S to the Shan State, immediately; (2) unreserved
cooperation
be given in eliminating opium cultivation and drug production;
(3) the
unhindered access for non-governmental and humanitarian
organisations
to various parts of Burma, particularly to the Shan State and
(4)
to release all political prisoners, especially the MP-elects
held in detention
since last August.
.
